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Abstract 
 
Researchers from the GRIALE group (Irony and Humour Research Group) have developed a 
theoretical method that can be applied to humorous ironic utterances in different textual genres, 
depending on the degree of the violation of conversational principles in conversation. In addition 
to this, the General Theory of Verbal Humor (Attardo and Raskin, 1991) will be taken into 
account in the analysis. Therefore, I will study irony and humour in conversational utterances in 
real examples of Peninsular Spanish obtained from the COVJA, (Corpus de conversaciones 
coloquiales [Corpus of Colloquial Conversations]) and CREA, (Corpus de Referencia del 
Español Actual [Reference Corpus of Present-Day Spanish]). The focus of this paper is then the 
application of the aforementioned theories to humorous ironic statements which arise in 
conversation. I will also examine the positive or negative effects caused by them, which will 
additionally verify if irony and humour coexist in the same conversational exchange, and if this 
has a communicative goal.  
 
 
Keywords: irony, humour, politeness, effect. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper proposes the analysis of ironic utterances with a humorous effect in 
conversation. Humour has so far been preferentially studied in humorous genres, where the 
listener is predisposed to humour, such as monologues (Ruiz Gurillo 2012), jokes (Yus 1996), 
comic strips (Ruiz Gurillo & Padilla 2009) or humorous texts (Attardo 2001a). For this reason, 
the present paper aims at analyzing colloquial utterances in conversation, where humour appears 
in the utterance without the listener expecting it2. I will demonstrate that in many of these cases 
humour becomes a narrative and social strategy, similarly to irony and politeness. My starting 
hypothesis in this paper is that irony with humour –along with other effects such as politeness– is 
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used in conversation for a positive purpose such as strengthening ties between speaker and 
listener, thus denying the idea that irony and humour can only coexist with negative effects in 
conversation. 
Therefore, although there are studies related to humour which develop the idea that 
humour is a form of aggression –like Gruner (1978, 2000) or Garmendia (2010), amongst 
others– some of the researchers promote the idea that humour in ironic utterances can be a way 
of enhancing group cohesion (Norrick, 2003: 1342; Alba Juez 2000, 2001), which will be 
another of my main goals, too. First and foremost, I will try to argue that positive humour exists 
as a conversational strategy3. In my opinion, irony is a pragmatic phenomenon and humour is a 
consequence of the presence of irony in conversation (Ruiz Gurillo 2012).  
For my purposes, I will start from the analysis of the study of irony and humour in 
Spanish (Ruiz Gurillo and Padilla, 2009) and  the relationship of irony, humour and politeness, 
as developed by the GRIALE group, and from the study carried out within the framework of the 
General Theory of Verbal Humor4 (hereinafter GTVH). This theory has been put forward by 
Attardo (2001a, 2008) and Attardo and Raskin (1991) for the analysis of humorous utterances. In 
our view, the latter proposal is partly in tune with the GRIALE group’s theoretical approach 
(Ruiz Gurillo and Padilla, 2009) because the latter presents a study of irony and humour from a 
pragmatic and conversational standpoint and can additionally be applied to all sorts of utterances, 
and not only to those appearing in humorous genres (see section 2). This study will be 
corroborated with 200 examples of humour extracted from the Corpus de conversaciones 
coloquiales [Corpus of Colloquial Conversations] and the Covja (Corpus de la variedad juvenil 
universitaria del español hablado en Alicante) [Corpus of the young university variety of the 
Spanish spoken in Alicante], seeking to verify whether or not the model suggested by both the 
GRIALE group and Attardo’s model provide a new perspective for the analysis of these 
conversational utterances where humour and other phenomena appear as communicative 
strategies (section 3 below); and finally, a number of conclusions will be drawn in relation to the 
study of humour and irony (section 4). 
 
 
2. Humour and irony in the context of interaction 
 
 Most of the studies that discussed the link existing between irony and humour have 
focused on analyzing the concept of aggression5. This is why they have resulted in preconceived 
ideas about irony and humour as forms used in interaction for the purpose of showing the 
speaker’s superiority over the listener (Gruner 2000, Garmendia 2010, amongst others).  
 Nevertheless, it has been observed that in ironic-humorous conversational utterances  
irony and humour are pragmatic events which can coexist in interaction without the interlocutor 
necessarily being attacked (Alvarado 2012). In these cases, irony and humour are used to obtain 
mutual understanding between the interlocutors (Clift 1999, Alba Juez 2000, Gibbs 2000, 
Kotthoff 2002, Norrick 2003, Priego Valverde 2006), and even to show politeness; these are 
positive aims in conversation and are regarded as conversational strategies.  
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2.1. Verbal irony 
 
 The most important explanations of the nature of verbal irony refer to various theories 
which state that irony is an indirect speech act (Searle 1980), a transgression of the Maxim of 
Quality (Grice 1991[1975]), a category which entails an interpretative use of language, which is 
explained as an echo (Sperber and Wilson, 1994: 274; Wilson and Sperber, 2004: 265), or even 
as an argumentative resource or polyphony (Anscombre and Ducrot 1994).  
 I will focus on the GRIALE group’s approach in order to explain irony6, for two reasons: 
it offers a systematic explanation of verbal irony and it is compatible with the theory of S. C. 
Levinson (cf. Rodríguez Rosique 2009). Without denying the particularized nature of irony, it is 
considered essential to resort to those generalizable inferences which imply some indicators and 
marks as ironic7. GRIALE defines marks as those cues which are helpful in the ironic 
interpretation (intonation, gestures…), whereas indicators are ironic structures as such (e.g. 
idioms). The ironist uses indicators and leaves marks that will serve as a guide to the listener to 
interpret the speaker’s words. Irony is thus explained by the GRIALE Group through the 
inversion8 of the Levinson conversational principles (Rodríguez Rosique, 2009: 120). It is worth 
remembering that Levinson9 (2000) starts from the fact that the Quality requirement (of a true 
utterance) is a pre-condition of every communicative exchange. When this is not met, it is 
because some participant in the communicative act has violated one of Levinson’s conversational 
principles (2000).  
 For GRIALE, the inversion of different principles in ironic contexts gives rise to different 
types of irony (prototypical, which means a denial of what is said, or unprototypical, which 
implies another linguistic mechanism)10. Thus, when the Principle of Quantity (Q) –the one 
assuming that we should provide precise information– is violated in an ironic utterance, 
prototypical irony (saying the opposite) is achieved, as inferences are obtained by denying what 
is said. For instance: 
 
          (1) 
    A: Excuse me, what do you think of Monica Lewinsky? 
                 B: Monica Lewinsky? Well, as far as I know she is a very loyal person. 
 
The utterance can be interpreted literally, i.e. that Monica Lewinsky is loyal and devoted 
to her friends, or non-literally because Monica Lewinsky actually became famous for 
denouncing President Clinton after having a sexual relationship with him. For this reason, the 
word “loyal” should be interpreted in its opposite sense (prototypical irony). 
 In contrast, irony is not prototypical in those cases where we invert the Principle of 
Informativity (I) –which suggests giving sufficient information– and the Principle of Manner (M) 
–which recommends not to use ambiguous expressions: irony is implied by multiplicity of 
referents in the first case or by marked expressions in the second (Ruiz Gurillo 2010). Ruiz 
Gurillo (2010: 110) similarly proposes to treat as prototypical those examples of irony in which 
Levinson’s (2000) Principle of Quantity is inverted and as non-prototypical those in which the 
Principle of Informativity or Manner are inverted. In the examples below in (2), the speaker 
inverts Principles of Informativity and Manner, whereas in (3) only the Principle of Manner is 
inverted: 
 
 
 (2) 
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A: Rafa Nadal is called the king of clay, but he is angry because he thinks that he is the king of 
the earth. 
 
 (3) 
 A: Do you have any health problem? 
 B: I have extrasystolic arrhythmia and I had a heart attack two years ago. But nothing important, 
I am ready to donate blood. 
 
In (2) the speaker inverts Principles of Informativity and Manner to be ironic because he 
uses king of clay as a tennis idiom in Spanish and the listener is led to understand it literally. In 
(3) B answers with an expression marked by technical words to be ironic too, so the Principle of 
Manner is inverted.  
 Consequently in the utterances ironic expressions are used to refer literally, but they are 
not prototypical instances of irony, because these expressions do not deny the initial statement 
explicitly. In other words, the theory put forward by GRIALE finds its main driving force in 
inversion, that is, the particularized conversational implicatures generated by the utterance would 
be inverted by some maxims and, therefore, the conversational principles are in turn inverted 
(prototypical irony, though scalar). This fact prevails over other conversational principles which 
might be considered unconsciously by the speaker in the same utterance, such as the Manner or 
Quantity Principles. This explanation allows us to find certain recurrent patterns in the 
interpretation of irony in utterances –despite the belief that irony is essentially contextual. 
Furthermore, the marks and indicators appearing in the utterance help to create an ironic context 
that the listener must understand as ironic (see Ruiz Gurillo and Padilla 2009).  
Irony is consequently conceived of as a pragmatic phenomenon based on indicators and 
marks, which is why it is possible to offer an explanation that goes beyond the particular contexts 
where irony arises. Therefore, GRIALE´s model allows me to explain a greater number of 
humorous ironic examples with an inferred meaning than other models. 
 
 
2.2. Verbal humour 
 
Humour has been treated from different points of view, e.g. sociolinguistic, ethnographic, 
etc., although my focus of interest in this paper is the pragmatic view. 
Attardo (1994: 47) highlights some perspectives from which humour has been considered: 
the aggression theories (for which every humorous experience arises as an expression of 
superiority felt by a human being towards another human being), the release theories (for which 
humour is a final effect resulting from a release of accumulated energy) and the incongruity 
theories (according to which humour is based on the discovery of a meaning or a thought that 
turns out to be inconsistent with what was expected) (cf. footnote 5). Of all these approaches, it 
is the incongruity theories that I am interested in because they broadly adopt a pragmatic 
approach, even though we can also find different perspectives among them, such as relevance 
theory and the GTVH. Furthermore, these theories can be applied to specific contextual 
utterances and they cannot establish generalizations about the use of irony and humour in 
conversations. 
Thus, Yus (1996: 502) states from a relevance-theoretic perspective that humour is a 
strategy that he calls incongruity-resolution (cf. Suls 1972). In this strategy, the speaker produces 
invalid cognitive expectations and the listener has to resolve the cognitive dilemma. The listener 
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recognizes that he has been deceived since he has not taken other possible interpretations into 
account. This deception recognition on the part of the listener gives rise to the humorous effect. 
The breaking of expectations is claimed to take place in terms of relevance (Yus, 1996: 504), that 
is, the listener interprets the utterance according to the degree of pertinence that it has and rules 
out the information which is not relevant to interpret the utterance correctly. This exclusively 
relevance-theoretic approach does not help me to generalize on conversational exchanges 
because it depends on the context of each utterance; hence my decision to analyze Attardo’s 
proposal for a General Theory of Verbal Humor (2001a). 
  Two phenomena exist in humour according to Attardo (2001b: 167), namely: humour 
competence and humour performance. The former is the ability that allows the speaker and the 
listener to generate and recognize humour within a specific context, whereas the latter one has to 
do with the desire as well as the willingness to accept it. Therefore, both the speaker and the 
listener take part in the interaction with marks in the utterance that help the interlocutor to 
interpret that utterance properly (Alvarado 2006). This is the idea which connects Attardo’s 
GTVH with GRIALE’s proposal, according to which every communicative exchange places at 
the listener’s disposal indicators or marks –i.e. linguistic mechanisms using Attardo’s 
terminology– which serve as clues to interpret the utterance in an ironic and humorous way. For 
this reason, I will adjust Attardo and Raskin´s GTVH (1991) in order to apply it later to the 
utterances analyzed in this paper. 
 In accordance with the GTVH (Attardo, 2001a: 22; 2008: 108) six types of knowledge 
resources exist which make it possible to detect whether a text is humorous or not and exhibit a 
hierarchical relationship. These knowledge resources are: script opposition, logical mechanism, 
situation, target, narrative strategy, and, finally, language. This theory permits to analyze more 
complex forms of humour than jokes, for instance, humour in interaction or in monologues. 
 Attardo (2001a: 62) points out that humour is different depending on whether it takes 
place in narrative texts or in conversation. The essential difference lies in the planning (or the 
lack of it), and the importance that the context has for a correct utterance interpretation. 
However, the method applied to the analysis of the different humour texts is the same (Attardo, 
2001a: 82), as it has to do with the identification of the humorous lines whether they are situated 
in the plot (jab lines) or at the end of the text (punch lines). They are identical elements 
semantically speaking, and the only differences they display are their textual position and their 
pragmatic function. Therefore, if they appear in the middle of the conversation, they help to 
provide the listener with clues about their humorous intention, i.e. they are used as a jab line, 
whereas they represent a humorous punch line when they appear at the end.  
In those cases where a punch line appears, the speaker forces the listener to activate a 
new semantic framework or script to ensure a correct utterance interpretation, which contrasts 
with the one appearing at the beginning of the text. All this is perfectly complementary to the 
explanation suggested by GRIALE for ironic-humorous utterances, since the listener can 
interpret the communicative exchange as ironic and humorous through indicators and marks (the 
language knowledge resource described by Attardo) (Alvarado 2006). Moreover, because 
conversational exchanges, on which this paper focuses, are not a humorous genre, such as the 
humorous monologue or the joke, the listener has to use his/her pragmatic ability to understand 
the humour (humour performance).  
From the interactional point of view, Hay (2000) and Holmes and Marra (2002) carry out 
a study of humour as a social strategy that helps to strengthen interpersonal relationships. Hay 
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(2000) argues that solidarity is a function of humour in conversation, an idea that I share when it 
comes to explaining its effects on conversation. 
Irony and humour are both interpretative language forms and they also involve the 
essentially pragmatic contrast and indirect negation. In their condition as pragmatic facts, they 
both violate pragmatic principles (Ruiz-Gurillo 2012, Rodríguez-Rosique 2009). In fact “irony 
may contribute to the perception of humour in a text” (Attardo, 2001a: 122). Although contact 
points exist (humorous irony and ironic humour), irony and humour are actually distinct 
phenomena: unlike irony, which is essentially a pragmatic fact, humour is simultaneously 
semantic and pragmatic. Furthermore, irony echoes explicitly communicated assumptions while 
humour echoes implicitly expressed ones. Irony additionally entails negative inferences, whereas 
humour requires a substitution of one script for another. More specifically, irony is understood as 
indirect negation, while humour basically revolves around a script-replacing antonymic 
mechanism. With regard to the inferences involved, irony primarily entails the violation of the 
Principle of Quantity and Manner. Instead, humour involves the infringement of the 
Informativity and Manner Principle (Ruiz-Gurillo, 2012: 131-141). To summarize all these ideas, 
I consider that irony and humour can coexist in a conversational utterance, because irony is a 
resource of humour, and humour is an effect of irony, as we will see in the examples below. 
 
 
3. The effects of irony and humour on conversation 
 
 The previous section aimed at explaining what is understood by ‘irony’ and ‘verbal 
humour’ as proposed by GRIALE (Ruiz Gurillo and Padilla 2009) for irony in Spanish and by 
the General Theory of Verbal Humor (Attardo 2001a). 
 Concerning humour performance, Attardo (2001a: 120) relates irony and humour in 
interaction and points out that both are basically used as social management strategies. Among 
other reasons for which irony is used, Attardo highlights the –inclusive as well as exclusive– 
group membership; sophistication, which has to do with the speaker’s mental skill; evaluation, 
understood as an attitude towards the utterance or its assessment; and politeness, which serves to 
protect the speaker’s social image in communicative exchanges11. 
 As we can see, the effects that humour can exert on conversation quite often have to do 
with those likely to be produced by irony, and they can affect face work and politeness12. After 
all, humour and irony are two pragmatic events that have been inherited from traditional rhetoric, 
as is explained by Hidalgo and Iglesias (2009: 424). Furthermore, humour has been treated as a 
phenomenon which evaluates irony, i.e. the speaker uses an ironic utterance to laugh down his 
listener, consequently damaging his public face.  
 We can observe that irony and humour are in turn positively related to politeness13, that 
is, their use helps both to highlight the interlocutor’s positive face and to strengthen ties 
(Alvarado 2012). As for politeness, Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987: 13) state that it is based 
on the concept of face as public face, which needs to be protected and, to that end, an effort must 
be made to avoid damaging other people’s public image: 
 
Central to our model is a highly abstract notion of face which consists of two specific kinds of 
desire (face-wants) attributed by interactants to one another: the desire to be unimpeded in 
one’s actions (negative face), and the desire (in some respects) to be approved of (positive 
face).  
                        (Brown and Levinson 1978, 1987: 13) 
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The positive image is the one that the individual has about himself, for which he aspires to obtain 
recognition by the other group members; in other words, the individual would like others to 
accept his personality and behaviour in some of their manifestations. In contrast, the negative 
image refers to each individual’s hope that his acts will not be treated disrespectfully by the 
others, i.e. that his actions will not be impeded and that his right to privacy will be reinforced. In 
this way, the speaker can develop communication strategies that help him/her both to maintain 
his/her positive face and to defend his/her negative face against the listener’s verbal attack. 
 In their work, Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987: 213) list a series of indirect linguistic 
strategies –among them jokes and irony– that produce politeness. According to these authors, 
these strategies do help the speaker to defend his/her public face by means of conversational 
implicatures; in other words, the speaker does not clearly express his/her intervention because it 
would violate the Maxims of Manner and Informativity (Rodríguez Rosique, 2009: 110), and the 
listener has to infer in ironic-humorous terms what the speaker is trying to communicate with 
his/her utterance. All this allows us to deduce that irony and humour are strategies which can use 
politeness to reach their ultimate aim, as will be confirmed by the analysis of examples. 
 Therefore, it seems that I can apply to humour the scheme (see Figure 1) used to 
summarize the effects of irony on conversation along with its connection to politeness and put 
forward in a previous paper (Alvarado, 2009: 337). Furthermore, I will demonstrate –thanks to 
the application of the GTVH and to the study carried out by the GRIALE group– that both 
phenomena function similarly in conversation: 
 
HUMOUR WITH A 
NEGATIVE EFFECT 
(- politeness) 
HUMOUR WITH A POSITIVE EFFECT 
(+/- politeness) 
-At the listener 
 
 
 
Humour with a 
positive image 
-At the listener 
-At an absent person 
 
-At an absent person 
-At a situation 
 
-At a situation 
  
Humour with a 
negative image 
 
-Self-humour (the speaker makes 
humour about himself) 
Figure 1. Humour and its effects (Alvarado, 2009: 337) 
 
I can consequently distinguish two kinds of humour depending on their effects on the 
conversation. Humour with a negative effect arises in an utterance when we find damage to the 
public face of the listener or of an absent person or we criticize a situation. In these cases, 
politeness is not present because the context does not admit it due to the appearance of an image 
attack, so impoliteness may appear, when the listener’s face is damaged by the speaker, as a way 
to protect his/her public face.  
If there is no damage and criticism in the humorous utterance, the utterance has humour with 
a positive effect, and pragmatic strategies appear to strengthen ties between speaker and hearer. 
Furthermore, this latter type of humour with a positive effect may in turn convey a negative 
 European Journal of Humour Research 3 (1) 
Open-access journal | www.europeanjournalofhumour.org 
29 
image or a positive image, and politeness14 is likely to appear as a pragmatic strategy. If humour 
conveys a negative image, the result will be self-humour, which means that the speaker produces 
humour about himself in order to keep his social image and make sure that the rest of the 
participants in the conversation recognize his identity and behaviour. Finally, if it is humour with 
a positive image, the speaker wants to be integrated into the conversational group and humour 
can be addressed at the listener, at an absent person or at a situation15.  
We will see all the differences between positive and negative effects in the analysis of the 
examples below, and we will see that humour and irony are two communicative strategies at the 
service of the speaker. They can additionally be used to include or exclude someone from the 
conversational group; humour and irony coexist in the conversational utterance, as will be also 
shown in the study of the occurrences presented below. 
 In (4)16 we can observe several interlocutors talking about the time spent abroad by A as a 
student and about the food he prepared for himself: 
 
 (4) 
C: perooo un plato combinao 
 
 
A:                                                                                           § tenía una- 
va!// plato combinao me lo hago yo/ si tenía allí yooo una cocina/// mis huevos y mis cosas 
(RISAS) 
C: [(RISAS)] 
B: [(RISAS)=] 
D: [sus huevos]17 
B: = sus huevos y sus-§ 
D:                           § mis huevos y yo somos asíi 18§ 
       (Briz and grupo Val.Es.Co., 2002:62 [H.38.A.1:469-480]) 
  
C: buuut a meal on one plate [e.g. with burgers, eggs and fries] 
A: for goodness sake! I can prepare my own meals on one plate 
B:                                                        of tapas [small portions of food] no way, right? 
A:                                                                               I had one –not tapas either –  of course 
not//I can prepare myself a meal on one plate//I…I… actually had a kitchen there///my eggs 
and my things (LAUGHTER) 
C: [LAUGHTER] 
B: [(LAUGHTER)=] 
D: [his eggs] 
B: = his eggs and his 
D:                               my eggs and I are like that  
 We can observe in (4) how humour is triggered by the utterance mis huevos y mis cosas 
[my eggs and my things] –reproduced by A– in which there is a play on words based on the 
polysemy of the word huevos [eggs, as a dish or as testicles because of their oval shape], as an 
irony indicator (GRIALE approach). Thus, listeners D and B interpret the utterance ironically 
and D builds a sentence mis huevos y yo somos así [my eggs and I are like that] in direct speech 
–emulating A’s words– where the use of huevos is interpreted with a sexual meaning as testicles. 
That is how laughter is triggered19 as a direct consequence of verbal humour in this particular 
case.  
This example additionally illustrates a violation of the Informativity and Manner 
Principles, since the use by the speaker of polysemous words which act as indicators of irony 
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activates several referents which the listener interprets suitably; in other words, a script 
opposition has taken place based on the ambiguity of meaning in the word huevos –as food or as 
a male sexual organ. It must be added that the logical interpretation mechanism has been altered 
by an imperfect reasoning, since the listener has interpreted ‘eggs’ as ‘testicles’, when he is 
really talking about food. The utterance’s situation is produced in a colloquial conversation 
between some friends who have decided to go to the countryside and have lunch there and they 
are talking about food. In his utterance, the speaker does not seek to create humour from the 
start; however, the relaxed situation he finds himself in together with the ambiguity of the word 
he uses leads the listeners to make a humorous interpretation of mis huevos y mis cosas, which 
acts as a jab line. That is why his interlocutors continue and reproduce the humorous punch line 
mis huevos y yo somos así in direct speech. Due to all this, A becomes the humorous target of the 
utterance without that being detrimental to his public image, because they are a group of friends 
and D causes humour to create a positive effect on the conversation –strengthening their 
camaraderie ties– which is why politeness and group identity are reflected in this example of 
humour with a positive effect for the listener, that is A. The narrative strategy used in this 
conversation is irony with humour, in this case, we can see it by the appearance of laughter in 
conversation –the mark and the effect of humour, as GRIALE emphasizes (Ruiz Gurillo, 2012: 
38).  
 In (5), the same interlocutors who appeared in the previous conversation talk about the 
topic of infidelity: 
 
 (5) 
C: si no pasa ná ↓ porque tenemos todos cuernos ↑ no pasa nada 
A: a mí no me ha puesto nadie los cuernos 
B: se los ha puesto él 
A: no he tenido ocasión de pon- de que me los pusieran aún 
B: se los has puesto tú a alguien ¿no? 
A: tampoco// se los han puesto/// yo no le he puesto a nadie los cuernos 
B: has colaborado activamente 
A: por supuesto [(RISAS)=] 
B:                    [(RISAS)] 
A: = pero yo lo hacía sin- sin conocimiento§ 
B:                                                         § de causa/ y de efecto (RISAS) 
                                       (Briz y grupo Val.Es.Co., 2002:65 [H.38.A.1:599-610]) 
  
C: But it’s nuthin’ ↓ because we all have horns [are cuckolds] ↑ nothing happens 
A: nobody has cheated on me [made me a cuckold] 
B: he has cheated on him 
A: I haven’t had the chance to ch- to be cheated on yet 
B: you have cheated on someone, haven’t you? 
A: I haven’t either//he has been cheated on///I have never cheated on anyone 
B: you have collaborated actively  
A: of course [(LAUGHTER)=] 
B:                     [LAUGHTER] 
A: = but I did it – unknowingly 
B:=                                       [without knowledge] of cause/ and of effect [LAUGHTER] 
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 B tries to prove in (5) that A belongs to the group of “cornudos” [cuckolds] like the other 
group members, as he slept with a girl who was unfaithful to her boyfriend with him. The 
utterance is interpreted in an ironic and humorous way due to B’s intervention has colaborado 
activamente [you have collaborated actively], which shows a diastratic variation because words 
belonging to the formal register in Spanish have been used in a colloquial conversation. The 
Principle of Manner has been violated as a result of B´s words has colaborado activamente. A 
does not expect B’s answer that is why it produces humour. Then we can observe that A 
participates in the same conversation and answers his interlocutor using a discourse marker that 
expresses agreement (por supuesto [of course]), with a literal meaning, and therefore A admits 
before his friends that he is a cornudo. Added to this is the intervention that he did it sin 
conocimiento (an adverbial phrase which means ‘unknowingly’) and B adds sin conocimiento de 
causa y efecto [without knowledge of cause and effect], which turns the colloquial phrase into a 
technical-looking expression that is typical of a more elaborate variety. So diastratic variation 
and its extension through the example produce a humorous utterance, where A’s public image 
has been damaged by B but with a positive effect, because they are all friends and they 
strengthen their friendship with humour. 
 Moreover, the Principles of Informativity and Manner are violated, since the use of 
phraseology activates referents of the script opposition between poner los cuernos [cheating on 
someone] and que le pongan a alguien los cuernos [someone being cheated on] because the 
speaker draws a distinction between these two frameworks, not seeing himself as the agent of the 
action. So, there are two different perspectives: the existence of someone who cheats entails the 
existence of someone being cheated on20. A change of the logical mechanism is also interpreted 
by the listener, since the reasoning made by the speaker is correct, but the listener interprets it 
differently to produce irony and humour. The indicators used in this case –change of register and 
phraseology– act as a clue or jab line (-has colaborado activamente-), to trigger the punch line, (-
sin conocimiento de causa y efecto-). Moreover, the communicative situation takes place in a 
relaxed context with friends who are spending a day in the countryside. That is why the target of 
humour, although it is again A, does not aim at damaging his public image, but at showing group 
identity; in other words, it is humour with a positive effect for the friendship. The irony which 
appears in the utterance is used as a narrative strategy at the service of humour in conversation, 
as GRIALE´s approach emphasizes (Ruiz Gurillo, 2012: 38).  
 (6) features the same interlocutors from the preceding examples who are now talking 
about an absent girl, a friend of D’s: 
 
 (6) 
B: ¿QUÉ has estao en su casa/ cabrón↑y te la has tirao ya? 
D: no/ pero me lo dijo queee§ 
A:                                     § se la lleva todos los días aaa casa hombre 
D: sí/ y en el coche↑/ me coge la marcha↑ y (RISAS) y me pone la primera/ tú pásame las 
[papaas] 
C:                 [(RISAS)] 
B:                   [(RISAS)]/// pues tú en seguida pones la marcha atrás ¿no Caty? 
D: yo sí  
(Briz and grupo Val.Es.Co., 2002:55 [H.38.A.1:195-204]) 
 
  
 B: YOU SAY you’ve been at her house/ bastard ↑and you’ve screwed her already? 
 D: no/but (she) told me thaaat 
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                  A:                                             that he takes her home every day, man 
D: yes/and in the car↑she takes my gear stick↑ and [LAUGHTER] puts me in first gear / you   
pass me the fries 
C:                [(LAUGHTER)] 
B:                [(LAUGHTER)]///and you put the reverse gear right away, don’t you, Caty?  
D: I do                  
 
 The participants in (6) expect D to confirm that he has made out with his girlfriend when 
giving her a lift in his car. However, as this was not the case, D answers his interlocutors with an 
ironic humorous utterance (sí/ y en el coche/ me coge la marcha y me pone la primera [yes/ and 
in the car/ she takes my gear stick and puts me in first gear]) where he plays with the double 
sense of the verb coger (take), which acts as an indicator from GRIALE´s approach because it 
has a double meaning in Spanish (sexual meaning and literal meaning); furthermore, he 
personalizes this play on words with the use of the pronoun my (me coge la marcha, me pone la 
primera) seeking to cause a stronger impact on his listener. We can therefore observe that an 
opposition of semantic scripts exists; on the one hand, we activate the semantic script llevar a su 
amiga en coche [give his girlfiend a lift in his car] and, on the other hand, that of tener sexo con 
ella [having sex with her]. It is the first jab line which appears in the fragment of the 
conversation and is giving the listener clues for its correct interpretation. This general script 
opposition favours incongruities in the situation where the participants find themselves; we 
should not forget that they are spending a day in the countryside. The target of humour is the 
absent girlfriend. In this case, irony and humour have a negative effect on a person, because her 
public image is damaged. D is suggesting that she is an easy girl. Nevertheless, this humorous 
utterance actually has positive effects on the conversational group because irony and humour are 
used as strategies to consolidate group identity and strengthen ties with the interlocutors by 
means of language. It is an example of continuing irony –ironic utterance continued by listener 
and speaker– where the interventions produce constant jab lines which the listener interprets 
humorously due to the breaking of expectations, as is shown to us by laughter. 
 We have the same interlocutors once again in (7). In this case, D suggests that his friends 
watch a movie in the evening, more precisely an action movie: 
 
 
 
 (7) 
D:                                                                  [a ver↓ esta] tarde se podía ver una película de 
video 
B: y mañana otra (RISAS) 
A: nooo Caty/ no te envicies/ hay que descansar esta [tarde] 
D:                                                                       [no↓ pero] un- película de video normal↓ de esas 
deee acción 
A: (RISAS) 
B: de acción (RISAS) 
D: de acción/ hombre/// de Bruce Li [(RISAS)] 
B:                                                   [Susi y Puti] se van de→ (RISAS) 
                                      (Briz and grupo Val.Es.Co., 2002: 59 [H.38.A.1:355-364]) 
  
 D:                                              [well↓ this] evening we could watch 
       a video movie 
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  B: and tomorrow another one (LAUGHTER) 
 A: nooo Caty/ don’t get hooked on that / we must rest this [evening] 
 D:                                                                       [no↓I mean] a- normal video            film↓, one 
of those aaaction ones 
 A: (LAUGHTER) 
 B: of action (LAUGHTER) 
 D: of action/ man/// of Bruce Li [(LAUGHTER)] 
 B:                                             [Suzy and Whory] go on→ (LAUGHTER) 
  
 In (7) D wants to watch a film with his friends and makes a suggestion (well this evening 
we could watch a video movie), to which B answers provoking an irony with a positive effect, 
because he specifies the kind of film they can watch and he continues in his subsequent 
interventions. Action movie is a mark according to GRIALE´s approach because of its double 
meaning. The Informativity Principle has been violated because a multiplication of referents has 
been created from the word movie and, as a result, the Principle of Manner has been violated as 
well. Thus, B echoes what has been previously said by his interlocutor D (-película de 
video_normal_de_esas_deee_acción [a normal video movie, one of those aaaction ones]) and 
gives a double meaning to the expression action movie; he plays with its metaphoric and 
polysemous use. In other words, there is a script opposition; on the one hand, we expect action 
movie and, on the other, we understand a pornographic movie.  
 Even though B’s ironic intervention is answered by D, who defends his argument of 
watching an adventure –i.e. not erotic– movie, his words una película de video normal, de esas 
de acción serves as the jab line to express irony and it produces a humorous effect, as shown by 
the appearance of laughter. The target of humour is D but his public image is not damaged; in 
fact, irony is used as a narrative and communicative strategy which helps to strengthen the ties 
with his interlocutors, and is expressed through plays on words, as is clearly shown in the punch 
line, Susi y Puti se van de… [Suzy and Whory go on…]. This is consequently an example of 
humour and irony with a positive effect for the listener, because he produces humour to enhance 
their friendship. 
 In (8) the interlocutors are talking about a piece of news that appeared on television 
where it was explained that chocolate contained an antidepressant substance which can also be 
found in marijuana: 
 
 (8) 
[E1]: El cho- el cho- sí (--->)... el chocolate de comer [/simultáneo].  
[H2]: ¡Huy!, pues a mí me gusta mucho, ¿eh?  
[H3]: Si hablando de drogas, metes el chocolate (--->)... pues...  
[E1]: Sí (--->), la gente deprimida siempre en las películas toma bombones.  
[H4]: Porque es má[(s)] barato [risas].  
[E1]: Pero, bueno [silencio] y es eso, y lleva la misma sustancia que lleva la marihuana... y la 
gente por eso se queda más a gusto, por lo mismo, en vez de, de comerse una tableta de 
chocolate, te fumas un porro, y no engorda. 
(Alcore, Covja, group 10) 
 
[E1]: The cho- the cho- yes (--->)... the chocolate to eat [/simultaneous].  
[H2]: Why! I like it very much actually, eh?  
[H3]: Yes, talking about drugs, you put the chocolate in (--->)... so...  
[E1]: Yes, (--->), depressed people in movies always eat chocolates.  
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[H4]: Because it’s mo[(re)]… cheap [laughter].  
[E1]: But, well [silence] and it’s that, and it has the same substance as marijuana... and that’s 
why people feel more at ease; for the same reason, instead of eating a chocolate bar, you 
smoke a joint and it’s not fattening. 
 
 The interlocutors in (8) produce a dialogue with a continuing irony. This happens because 
E1 uses the word chocolate and specifies that it is for eating (de comer). The script opposition 
consequently appears the same as in the preceding cases, because the listener interprets chocolate 
as food on the one hand but, on the other hand, he understands chocolate as drug (its other slang 
meaning in Spanish). In other words, faced with an incongruity, the interlocutor resolves the 
situation with the most suitable interpretation in this context. The Informativity Principle has 
consequently been violated because a multiplication of referents has been created from the 
polysemy in the word chocolate (chocolate as cocoa and chocolate as marijuana) and, as a result, 
the Principle of Manner has been violated as well, because something has been said in a marked 
way (it has been specified that the chocolate was for eating). In addition to that, H4 thinks it 
appropriate to make the comment porque es más barato [because it is cheaper], an intervention 
which is used by the other interlocutors as a jab line to show a humour mark, in which the target 
is the gente deprimida [depressed people], i.e. third persons who are absent in the conversation. 
Irony is thus used as a communicative strategy to produce humour with a positive effect for a 
situation, because they are talking about depressed people, not about themselves. So the 
participants in this communicative act have reinforced their ties in the conversational group and 
that additionally causes a continuing humorous effect, which creates an atmosphere of 
understanding between them, as is reflected by the appearance of laughter.  
 The interlocutors in (9) are the same ones who appeared in example (1). In this case, they 
have dropped the bottle stopper and do not clean it before putting it in its place again: 
 
 (9) 
A:    [sí sí] CÓGELÓ 
C: pásame una poca/ buenome pongo yo cocacol- y lo cojo 
B: limpiarlo  
D: [(RISAS)] 
B: [(RISAS)] desde luego tío→ 
D: (RISAS) es NAturaleza (RISAS) ¡hostia! esto estamos→ eeen la jungla/ (RISAS)§ 
B:               § sí  
 (Briz and grupo Val.Es.Co., 2002: 51 [H.38.A.1:41-49]) 
 
A:    [yes yes] TAKE IT!! 
C: pass me a bit/ well I’ll serve myself some Coca Col- and I’ll take it 
B: you clean it a bit, for goodness sake[damn it!] 
D: [(LAUGHTER)] 
B: [(LAUGHTER)] of course, dude→ 
D: (LAUGHTER) it is NAture (LAUGHTER) jeez! I mean we are erm…→ iiin the jungle/ 
(LAUGHTER)§ 
B:         § yes  
 
 In (9) D has taken the Coca-Cola bottle stopper which had fallen on the ground, but he 
has not cleaned it before placing it again in the bottle, as shown by B’s use of the subjective 
routine formula desde luego tío [Oh my god, dude!], which generates a script opposition that 
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produces humour, as everybody expects D to clean the stopper and he does not. The logical 
mechanism is based on a correct reasoning, as he was supposed to have cleaned it. The narrative 
strategy used is irony. The Principle of Manner has been violated because something has been 
said in a marked way (it has been specified that they are in the jungle). Thus, D finds himself in a 
communicative situation with friends in which it is appropriate not to clean the stopper, as shown 
by its subsequent ironic intervention es NAturaleza (RISAS) ¡hostia! esto estamos→ eeen la 
jungla [it is Nature (LAUGHTER) jeez! erm… we are  →  iiin the jungle]. 
 In this way, D becomes the target of humour without that having been his intention at the 
beginning of his intervention –as we can see with laughter and B’s intervention– and is then 
forced to protect his damaged face, as a result of his acts because he does not clean the stopper. 
In this case, we have humour with a positive effect in the friendship group to save D’s negative 
public face, because it is an example of self-humour intended to protect his public image that had 
already been unconsciously damaged by himself.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
  
 After having carried out the analysis of colloquial conversation examples, I can conclude 
that:  
  -Firstly, these utterances contain non-prototypical irony and humour; in other words, the 
speakers do not say the opposite of what they say, which means that they say something different 
that makes the utterances ironic and, therefore, the aim is to strengthen ties with the interlocutor, 
even if that implies attacking the public image of others, as in (6). 
 -Secondly, the examples confirm that irony and humour are mostly used to show 
solidarity, which I call positive effect, an idea that authors such as Attardo (2001b: 174), Kotthoff 
(2007: 264), Holmes and Marra (2002: 1684) and Hay (2000: 716), among others, often link 
exclusively to humour. I have demonstrated in (4), (5), (7), (8) and (9) that irony and humour 
coexist in conversational utterances in Spanish and they may cause a positive effect, thus 
following the scheme proposed in Alvarado (2009). In other words, they are conversational 
strategies at the service of interlocutors and they can consequently be used to include or exclude 
someone from the conversational group. This means that the traditional belief according to which 
humour was exclusively linked to negative irony is no longer valid in conversation. To 
summarize, Figure 2 illustrates the breakdown of humorous instances that appeared in our 
conversational corpus in terms of percentages: 
14
22
12
8
27
17
0 10 20 30
Humor with negative
effect
Humor with positive effect At a situation
At an absent person
At the listener
 
Figure 2. Humour in conversational examples 
 
 -Ironic-humorous utterances with a positive effect are predominant in Spanish (see Figure 
2, 66%). The reason is probably that humour and irony are never used to attack the public image 
of any participants; instead, they help to strengthen ties between them, as we have seen in (5), for 
example. Ironic-humorous utterances with a negative effect are less frequent in Spanish (see 
% 
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Figure 2, 34%), because the speakers do not want to damage their public face, as we have seen in 
(9).  
 -It seems clear from the examples analyzed that the speaker does not have a humorous 
intention at the beginning of the utterance. What happens is that polysemy and plays on words –
which are used not only as indicators of humour and irony but also as jab lines– turn the 
intervention into a humorous one, that is, humour arises due to the opposition of semantic scripts 
and the violation and inversion of the Principles of Informativity and Manner, which favour 
continuing irony between speaker and listener. 
 -In short, I have shown that GRIALE’s theoretical model –based on indicators, marks and 
inversion of principles, and Attardo’s GTVH model –based on knowledge resources, 
complement each other to explain ironic-humorous utterances emerging from the violation and 
inversion of conversational principles, which are followed by a series of generalizable inferences 
which the listener has to interpret in an ironic way. Therefore, humour with a positive effect is 
one of the values which the ironic utterance can convey in conversation after breaking the 
listener’s expectations.  
 
 
Notes
                                                 
1 This paper has been possible thanks to the Project FFI2012-30941: “Innovaciones lingüísticas del humor: géneros 
textuales, identidad y enseñanza del español” [Linguistic innovations of humour: textual genres, identity and 
Spanish learning]. A shorter version of this article has been published in Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 
(Alvarado, 2013: 594– 603). 
2 This assertion is based on the premise that conversation is not a humorous genre per-se (See Ruiz Gurillo 2012, 
section 4; Kotthoff 2000, among others). 
3 There are other researchers that support the claim that humour is positive and polite, see Holmes (2000), 
Antonopoulou and Sifianou (2003), Schnurr et al. (2005), Carranza Márquez (2010), amongst others. 
4 There are three main groups of theories (Raskin, 1985: 31-36) which deal with verbal humour: the Incongruity 
Theories; the Aggression Theories, and the Release Theories. Attardo’s General Theory of Verbal Humor (GTHV) 
is located within the group of Incongruity Theories, as he himself has made clear (Attardo, 2001a: 22). 
5 To obtain more information on this topic, see the issue of Journal of Pragmatics, 35 (2003), dedicated to humour. 
6 For the details of the method developed by GRIALE, see Ruiz Gurillo and Padilla (2009). 
7 See also Attardo (2001), Ruiz Gurillo et al. (2004), Ruiz Gurillo and Padilla (2009) and Alvarado (2005). 
8 Inversion is a technical term in the model (see Rodríguez Rosique, 2009: 120). 
9 Levinson outlines a neo-Gricean theory according to which the inferential reconstruction of the speaker’s 
intentions is based on what is salient for the interlocutors. Levinson agrees with Grice’s view that the meaning of an 
utterance is a composite of what is said and what is conventionally and conversationally implicated. This leads him 
to a reformulation of the maxims as heuristics, for example Heuristic 2: "What is expressed simply is stereotypically 
exemplified." (Levinson 2000: 37). He sees this as a reformulation of Grice’s second Maxim of Quantity:  "Do not 
make your contribution more informative than is required." Levinson’s Heuristic 3: "What's said in an abnormal way 
isn't normal" can be related to Grice’s Maxim of Manner. 
10 For specifics on this idea, see Ruiz Gurillo and Padilla (2009). 
11 Kotthoff (1996) arrives at the gradations from polite to impolite humorous speech activities. 
12 I understand politeness as a conversational strategy to avoid conflicts and maintain good relationships between 
interlocutors (Alvarado, 2005: 36). 
13 See also Matthews et al. (2006) for other studies relating politeness and humour. 
14 The direct link between politeness and humour has been studied by Holmes (2000), and Holmes and Marra 
(2002). 
15 The idea that humour is a conversational strategy has been analyzed by authors such as Archakis & Tsakona 
(2005), who state that humour builds the identity of speakers. 
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16The transcription system developed by Val.Es.Co. Group (Briz & Grupo Val.Es.Co., 2002: 29-31), see 
http://www.valesco.es/sistema.pdf.  We will see the original examples in Spanish, and their translations into English. 
17 Laughing. 
18 D ironically reproduces what he supposes that A could have stated. 
19 For the connection between laughter and humour, see Attardo (2008: 120), Archakis & Tsakona (2005: 44), Hay 
(2000: 711) or Kotthoff (2000: 64), amongst others. 
20 In linguistic semantics these are termed “converse terms”. 
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